Secure communication by user selectable communication range

ABSTRACT

An infusion system to administer fluid is disclosed. The infusion system to administer fluid includes an infusion pump having a pump processor, a pump memory and a pump radio to enable bi-directional communication. The pump radio further includes a configurable attenuator and the pump memory stores a plurality of security modes that configure the attenuator to receive signals of a predetermined strength. The infusion system further includes a controller with a controller processor, a controller memory, and a controller radio to transmit and receive communication from the pump radio. The controller further having a graphical user interface shown on a display, and controls to manipulate the graphical user interface. The controller further being paired with the infusion pump based on pairing data, wherein a security check is performed when the infusion pump receives a suspect signal, the suspect signal not matching the predetermined strength associated with a selected security mode.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention relates to portable medical devices, in particularembodiments, methods and systems to enable secure wirelesscommunications between infusion system components such as portableinfusion pumps and the controllers thereof.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Over the years, bodily characteristics have been determined by obtaininga sample of bodily fluid. For example, diabetics often test for bloodglucose levels. Traditional blood glucose determinations have utilized apainful finger prick using a lancet to withdraw a small blood sample.This results in discomfort from the lancet as it contacts nerves in thesubcutaneous tissue. The pain of lancing and the cumulative discomfortfrom multiple needle pricks is a strong reason why patients fail tocomply with a medical testing regimen used to determine a change incharacteristic over a period of time. Although non-invasive systems havebeen proposed, or are in development, none to date have beencommercialized that are effective and provide accurate results. Inaddition, all of these systems are designed to provide data at discretepoints and do not provide continuous data to show the variations in thecharacteristic between testing times.

A variety of implantable electrochemical sensors have been developed fordetecting and/or quantifying specific agents or compositions in apatient's blood. For instance, glucose sensors have been developed foruse in obtaining an indication of blood glucose levels in a diabeticpatient. Such readings are useful in monitoring and/or adjusting atreatment regimen which typically includes the regular administration ofinsulin to the patient. Thus, blood glucose readings improve medicaltherapies with semi-automated medication infusion pumps of the externaltype, as generally described in U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,562,751; 4,678,408; and4,685,903; or automated implantable medication infusion pumps, asgenerally described in U.S. Pat. No. 4,573,994, which are hereinincorporated by reference. Typical thin film sensors are described incommonly assigned U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,390,671; 5,391,250; 5,482,473; and5,586,553 which are incorporated by reference herein, also see U.S. Pat.No. 5,299,571. Additionally, the wireless controllers or monitors forthese continuous sensors provide alarms, updates, trend information andoften use sophisticated combination of software and hardware to allowthe user to program the controller and/or infusion pump, calibrate thesensor, enter data and view data in the monitor and to provide real-timefeedback to the user.

Additionally, the wireless communication between the infusion pump andthe controller can make the system susceptible to eavesdropping ofconfidential patient data and potentially hacking attacks to introduceor execute malicious code or commands. Being able to actively identify,isolate and interrogate unverified, or suspect signals received by thesystem can greatly enhance patient safety and security.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE

An infusion system to administer fluid is disclosed. The infusion systemto administer fluid, the infusion system includes an infusion pumphaving a pump processor, a pump memory and a pump radio to enablebi-directional communication. The pump radio further includes anconfigurable attenuator and the pump memory stores a plurality securitymodes, each of the plurality of security modes configuring theattenuator to receive signals of a predetermined strength. The infusionsystem further includes a controller with a controller processor, acontroller memory, and a controller radio to transmit and receivecommunication from the pump radio. The controller further having agraphical user interface shown on a display, and controls to manipulatethe graphical user interface. The controller further being paired withthe infusion pump based on pairing data, wherein a security check isperformed when the infusion pump receives a suspect signal, the suspectsignal not matching the predetermined strength associated with aselected security mode.

In another embodiment a method to secure wireless transmissions betweenan infusion device and a controller is disclosed. The method includes anoperation that pairs the infusion device and the controller with adefault security setting. The method also includes an operation thatprompts the setting of a security mode for on-going communicationbetween the infusion device and the controller. Another operation withinthe method initiates normal communication between the infusion deviceand the controller while still another operations initiate a securitycheck if a suspect signal is detected, a suspect signal being a signalthat does not match signal strength anticipated by the security mode.

Other features and advantages of the invention will become apparent fromthe following detailed description, taken in conjunction with theaccompanying drawings which illustrate, by way of example, variousfeatures of embodiments of the invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

A detailed description of embodiments of the invention will be made withreference to the accompanying drawings, wherein like numerals designatecorresponding parts in the several figures.

FIG. 1 is an exemplary illustration of components of an infusion systemthat includes a controller and an infusion pump, in accordance withembodiments of the present invention.

FIGS. 2A and 2B are exemplary block diagrams illustrating selectcomponents of two types of infusion pumps, in accordance withembodiments of the present invention.

FIG. 3A is an exemplary depiction of controller, in accordance with anembodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 3B is an exemplary block diagram showing select elements within thecontroller, in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 3C illustrates exemplary elements within the communication modulein accordance with embodiments of the present invention.

FIGS. 4A and 4B illustrate an exemplary use of the controller with theinfusion pump on a user, in accordance with one embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 5A is an exemplary flow chart illustrating operations to securelypair the controller and the infusion pump, in accordance withembodiments of the present invention.

FIG. 5B is an exemplary flow chart illustrating operations whereproximity between previously paired devices is estimated based on signalstrength and if a threshold distance is exceeded and persists for apreset or threshold period of time the paired devices are disconnected,in accordance with embodiments of the present invention.

FIG. 6 is an exemplary flowchart illustrating operations to utilize userconfigurable security modes for securely paired infusion pump andcontroller, in accordance with embodiments of the present invention.

FIG. 7 is an exemplary flow chart illustrating specific operationswithin operation of FIG. 6, in accordance with embodiments of thepresent invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

As shown in the drawings for purposes of illustration, the invention isembodied in an infusion system. The infusion system may include aninfusion pump, a controller and a sensor assembly. The controller can beused to receive and transmit data from the infusion pump and the sensor.Wireless data transmission can also be used to determine a relativedistance separating the controller and the infusion pump. The ability todetermine or estimate the relative distance separating the controllerand infusion pump can enable various types of enhanced security toprotect both data exchanged between the controller and infusion pump andsensitive patient data stored on the infusion pump. In some embodimentssimilar estimates or determinations of relative distance can be madebetween the sensor assembly and the controller, or the sensor and theinfusion pump. Sensor data can be recorded and stored in a memoryassociated with the controller. In embodiments of the present invention,the analyte sensor set and monitor system are for determining glucoselevels in the blood and/or bodily fluids of the user without the use of,or necessity of, complicated monitoring systems that require usertraining and interaction. However, it will be recognized that furtherembodiments of the invention may be used to determine the levels ofother analytes or agents, characteristics or compositions, such ashormones, cholesterol, medications concentrations, viral loads (e.g.,HIV), or the like. In other embodiments, the monitor system may alsoinclude the capability to be programmed to record data at specified timeintervals. The monitor system and analyte sensor are primarily adaptedfor use in subcutaneous human tissue. However, still further embodimentsmay be placed in other types of tissue, such as muscle, lymph, organtissue, veins, arteries or the like, and used in animal tissue. Theanalyte sensors may be subcutaneous sensors, transcutaneous sensors,percutaneous sensors, sub-dermal sensors, skin surface sensors, or thelike. Embodiments may record sensor readings on an intermittent orcontinuous basis.

In embodiments that include real-time determination of bodycharacteristic data various types of analysis can be performed by theinfusion pump, the controller or both on the real-time data. Theinfusion device and controller, being regulated by the Food and DrugAdministration, includes various safeguards regarding device security,patient data security, traceability and reporting requirements (e.g.,adverse events). Establishing trusted secure data transfer between thecontroller and the infusion pump in conjunction with various encryptiontechniques can provide enhanced data security of sensitive patient datastored. The combination of trusted secure data transfer with encryptiontechniques can help minimize unauthorized malicious insulin deliverycommands and/or wireless access to sensitive patient data stored on boththe infusion pump and the controller. The use of the techniquesdescribed below can further help identify and minimize the likelihood ofsuccess of wireless hacking attacks via suspect signals on the system.

FIG. 1 is an exemplary illustration of components of an infusion system100 that includes a controller 102 and an infusion pump 104, inaccordance with embodiments of the present invention. In one embodimentthe infusion pump 104 has minimal controls and the controller 102 is theprimary interface device to program and verify setting of the infusionpump 104. In one embodiment the controller 104 exchanges data with theinfusion pump 104 via bi-directional wireless communications facilitatedby radios, optical interconnections such as infra-red or the like.

In embodiments where the infusion pump 104 and the controller 102communicate wirelessly, the controller 102 can be used to configure orprogram an associated infusion pump 104 to deliver a basal rate.Additionally, in some other embodiments the controller 102 can be usedto program the infusion pump 104 to periodically remind a user via analert to deliver a bolus. For a basal, once the infusion pump 104 isprogrammed using the controller 102, the infusion pump 104 can executethe program without further interaction from the controller 102.

For example, using the controller 102 an infusion pump 104 is programmedto deliver a basal rate. Once programmed, the infusion pump 104 willdeliver the basal rate without further input from the controller 102until either a fluid reservoir within the infusion pump is exhausted viathe basal rate, the power supply to the infusion pump is exhausted, oranother type of delivery failure. Thus, after the infusion pump 104 isprogrammed, the infusion pump 104 will execute the program independentof the controller 102. The controller 102 can be used to modify oraugment the program of an infusion pump 104, however, the infusion pump104 does not require continual or periodic updates from the controller102 to execute a stored program.

FIGS. 2A and 2B are exemplary block diagrams illustrating selectcomponents of two types of infusion pumps 104A and 104B, in accordancewith embodiments of the present invention. In one embodiment theinfusion pump 104A illustrated in FIG. 2A is a patch pump that isdesigned to be affixed directly to a user's skin while infusion pump104B is an external infusion pump such as the Medtronic Minimed ParadigmRevel. As illustrated, the infusion pump 104B includes both a display210 and an interface 212 that are not found on the infusion pump 104A.In some embodiments the display 210 and the interface 212 found oninfusion pump 104B may duplicate some of the control functionalityprovided by the controller 102 (FIG. 1). While infusion pump 104A doesnot explicitly have an interface 212, the embodiment illustrated shouldnot be construed to preclude an interface. Infusion pump 104A andsimilar patch pumps may include interface features such as, but notlimited to, buttons, lights, and the like. Both infusion pumps 104A and104B include a reservoir 203 that contains a fluid that is infused intoa user. Additionally, the infusion pumps 104A and 104B also have aprocessor 200, a memory 202, a clock 204, a radio 206, and a battery208.

In one embodiment the memory 202 is used to store program instructionsthat are executed by the processor 200. The memory 202 may also be usedto store settings for the infusion pump 104 such as, but not limited to,basal rates for various times of day, and alert and remindersettings/triggers/thresholds along with a plurality of securityconditions. In embodiments where the infusion pump 104 is used todeliver insulin, the memory 202 can be used to store informationspecific to a user such as, but not limited to a carbohydrate-to-insulinratio (CM) and an insulin sensitivity factor (ISF) of a user. In allembodiments, the memory 202 may be used in conjunction with the clock204 to store various alarms, alerts and/or reminders. Some of thevarious alarms that are associated with the clock 204 are periodicnotifications of an infusion or periodic notifications that the usershould perform a check of their blood glucose value. Furthermore, thememory 202 can be used to store threshold values to trigger variousalarms to notify a user of issues discovered during a diagnostic test ofthe infusion pump. For example, the memory 202 can include thresholdvalues to determine if there is occlusion of the infusion site, aninfusion line, or if a battery needs to be replaced. The types ofthreshold alarms discussed above are merely exemplary and should not beconstrued as limiting.

The alarms or alerts are conveyed to a user either audibly or tactilely.Audible alarms can include, but are not limited to audible beeps,chirps, and polyphonic ringtones. Furthermore, a user can adjust thevolume of the audible alarms using a simple rocker switch associatedwith either the controller 102, the infusion pump 104 or in someembodiments, both the controller 102 and the infusion pump 104. In otherembodiments another type of user interface, such as a slider displayedvia a graphic user interface, a click-wheel type device, or a knob, onthe controller 102, the infusion pump 104 or both, can be used to adjustthe volume of the alarms. Tactile alarms can be conveyed to the user viavibration from the controller 102, the infusion pump 14 or both. In someembodiments the intensity of the tactile alarms can be adjusted so thetactile alarms are relatively discrete.

FIG. 3A is an exemplary depiction of controller 102, in accordance withan embodiment of the present invention. The controller 102 is containedwithin a case 300 and is generally proportioned to be held in a singlehand. The controller 102 includes a screen 306 that in some embodimentsis touch sensitive and can be used as the primary interface for a userinterface displayed on the screen 306. The orientation of the screen 306in a portrait mode, as shown in FIG. 3A, should not be perceived aslimiting as other embodiments of the controller 102 can have the screen306 oriented in a landscape mode. Alternatively, the controller 102 caninclude accelerometers that allow images displayed on the screen 306 totransition between portrait and landscape depending on how a user holdsthe controller 102. Buttons 302 a, 302 b, and 302 c can further beincluded in some embodiments of the controller 102.

The buttons 302 a, 302 b and 302 c can be used to provide quick accessto different elements of the user interface displayed on the screen 306.Exemplary functions that can be assigned to the buttons 302 a, 302 b and302 c are navigating the user interface to a previous screen, navigatingthe user interface to a home page, or bringing up a help screen thatdefines elements currently displayed on the screen 306. In otherembodiments, buttons 302 a, 302 b and 302 c can be replaced withmultifunction input capacitive buttons and/or fingerprint readers. Whilebuttons 302 a, 302 b and 302 c are shown, other embodiments of thecontroller 102 can have fewer buttons, more buttons or even no buttons.In still other embodiments, simultaneously pressing a combination ofbuttons 302 a, 302 b and 302 c can be associated with particular actionssuch as automatically muting alarms, powering the controller 102 on oroff, rebooting the controller 102, or having the controller 102 enter adiagnostic mode. The particular examples provided are not intended to belimiting and should not be construed to be associated with thesimultaneous pressing of buttons. In other embodiments specificsequences of button presses can be used to initiate any of theparticular actions discussed above. Furthermore, the location of buttons302 a, 302 b and 302 c should not be construed as limiting as the case300 can accommodate the buttons in a variety of locations.

FIG. 3B is an exemplary block diagram showing select elements within thecontroller 102, in accordance with one embodiment of the presentinvention. The elements discussed below are intended to be exemplary andare not representative of every element within the controller 102. Thecontroller 102 includes a processor 308 that is coupled to a memory 310.In some embodiments the memory 310 is representative of both static RAMand dynamic RAM. Thus, the memory 310 is used to store programinstructions that are executed by the processor 308. The programinstructions that can be stored in the memory 310 include instructionsthat render and control a graphical user interface and instructions thatallow the controller to communicate with an associated infusion pump(not shown). The memory 310 may also be used to store informationspecific to a user such as a CIR or an ISF. In some embodiments thememory 310 is used to store program information that enables securepairing between the controller 102 and the infusion pump. The dynamicRAM portion of memory 310 can be used to temporarily hold data such asdisplay data that is to be displayed on the screen. The controller 102includes I/O controller 313 that can accept input from the variety ofbuttons or fingerprint readers 302 a, 302 b, 302 c, or buttons 304 a and304 b. Input through I/O controller 313 along with execution of programinstructions by the processor 308 and memory 310 can allow tokengeneration based on fingerprints to enable secure pairing between thecontroller and the infusion pump.

The controller 102 further includes a communication module 312. Thecommunications module 312 includes at least one radio that enableswireless communication with the infusion pump. In other embodiments thecommunication module 312 includes a plurality of radio options that areable to transmit and receive in various communication protocols such as,but not limited to, BlueTooth, Wi-Fi, CDMA, WiMAX, GSM, LTE and thelike. In additional embodiments, the communications module 312 isfurther configured to receive data from a continuous glucose monitoringsystem. In such embodiments, this allows the controller 102 to receivedata from a continuous glucose monitoring system and recommend therapythat can be implemented by the infusion pump.

The graphic user interface displayed on the screen 306 in conjunctionwith the communication module 312 allows a user to interface and programthe infusion pump 104 (FIG. 2). In some embodiments the controller 102includes multiple profiles that permit different users to exercisedifferent levels of programming control of the infusion pump 104. Forexample, by entering a password or personal identification number (PIN),a physician could access levels of programming control that areinaccessible to a general user. Similarly, in situations where theinfusion pump is worn by a child, the controller 102 can include aparental mode that allows a parent access to programming control that isinaccessible to the child.

FIG. 3C illustrates exemplary elements within the communication module312 in accordance with embodiments of the present invention. Though FIG.3C is directed toward the communication module 312 of the controller102, the radios 206 within infusion pumps 104A and 104B could also beconfigured to include the exemplary elements discussed below. Thus, insome embodiments the controller 102 and the infusion pump 104 would bothinclude a communication module 312. In still other embodiments only theinfusion pump 104 or the controller 102 would contain the communicationmodule 312 while the respective controller 102 or infusion pump 104would contain radio modules configured to communicate with communicationmodule 312. Communication processor 314 is shown connected to aBalun/matching circuit 316 and a digital attenuator 318. In someembodiments the communication processor 314 is a commercially availableBLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY system on chip with RF out 320 going to theBalun/matching circuit 316 which in turn provides feedback RF in 322along with output to the digital attenuator 318. Digital I/O 324 isfurther output from the communication processor 314 to the digitalattenuator 318. The digital attenuator is shown connected to antenna326.

By introducing the digital attenuator 318 between the Balun/matchingcircuit 316 and the antenna, the strength of both the input and outputsignal from an device having communication module 312 can be altered toimplement a type of active security. For example, this active securitycan allow a user to customize the ability of the infusion pump totransmit and receive signals thereby decreasing or minimizing thelikelihood of being a victim of a wireless hacking attack. In a secureenvironment, no attenuation would be necessary thereby allowing theinfusion pump to wireless communicate with elements up to 100 feet away.Whereas in an unsecure environment, the user can utilize the activesecurity resulting in signals from the infusion pump being attenuated sothe signal only propagates a few or up to six feet, thus making it moredifficult for a hacker to interfere with communications between thecontroller and the infusion pump.

The security level for the communication module 312 is user selectable.In some embodiments the user is allowed to choose between high security,medium security and low security, depending on the type of environmentthey find themselves. In one embodiment the high security settingrestricts receiving and transmission of signals from the infusion pumpto less than six feet. In still another embodiment the medium securitysettings allows receiving and transmitting of signals up to 50 feet. Instill other embodiments, the low security setting deactivates theattenuator thereby allowing receipt and transmission of signals to beunfettered from their predetermined settings. In still otherembodiments, the low security setting restricts receiving andtransmission of signals from the element that includes communicationmodule 312 to 100 feet. The specific examples discussed above regardingthe security settings are exemplary and should not be construed ascomprehensive or restrictive. It should be generally understood thathigh security provides the maximum restriction while low securityprovides the lowest restriction of receipt and transmission of signalsfrom devices having the communication module 312. Similarly, it shouldbe understood that medium security falls between high security and lowsecurity. The infusion pump and the controller would exchange theselected security mode during a pairing process that initiatescommunication and use relative signal strength to determine if spuriousor suspect signals are a threat. Once the security level is set,incoming signal strengths to the infusion pump are expected to be withina specified range. If the incoming signal strength is higher than theselected security mode (e.g. significant strength signal when only asmall strength signal is expected) program instructions would identifythe suspect signal and execute security check protocols to determine ifthe suspect signal is blocked or allowed.

FIGS. 4A and 4B illustrate an exemplary use of the controller 102 withthe infusion pump 104 on a user 400, in accordance with one embodimentof the present invention. In FIG. 4A the user 400 is shown wearing aninfusion pump 104 under their clothing while holding the controller 102.In FIG. 4B the controller 102 is in the pants pocket of user 400. Inthese illustration the controller 102 and the infusion pump 104 arepaired with a high security mode. As discussed above, the high securitymode means the signal strength will be greatly attenuated and eachdevice will anticipate receiving relatively low signal strength signalsfrom the paired device. FIGS. 4A and 4B further illustrate that relativesignal strength between the controller 102 and the infusion pump 104 canbe used to estimate the relative proximity, or the distance separatingthe controller 102 and the infusion pump 104. While there may beextraneous signals or physical barriers than interfere with reception,the relative signal strength between the infusion pump 104 and thecontroller 102 can be used to roughly estimate the proximity or distanceseparating the devices based on the signals attenuation along thecommunicating path. Thus, once the infusion pump 104 and the controller102 are paired, the distance, or relative proximity, between the two canbe periodically monitored. If the proximity between the controller 102and the infusion pump 104 exceeds a threshold distance for a thresholdtime period, the devices will be considered disconnected, or unpaired.

FIG. 5A is an exemplary flow chart illustrating operations to securelypair the controller and the infusion pump, in accordance withembodiments of the present invention. Operation 500 starts the flowchart while operation 502 initiates the pairing process. In someembodiments, the user interfaces of the controller and the infusion pumpallow users to begin pairing the devices via a user's fingerprints. Inembodiments where the controller initiates pairing, operation 504 hasthe controller requesting the user to scan a fingerprint using thefingerprint scanned discussed regarding FIGS. 3A and 3B. In otherembodiments, operation 504 request more than one fingerprint to bescanned. With operation 506 the controller calculates tokens based onthe scanned fingerprint or fingerprints. The calculation of tokensreduces data size for both storage and transmission to the infusionpump. Accordingly, operation 508 transmits the fingerprint(s) tokens tothe insulin pump to complete the pairing process with END operation 510.

FIG. 5B is an exemplary flow chart illustrating operations whereproximity between previously paired devices is estimated based on signalstrength and if a threshold distance is exceeded and persists for apreset or threshold period of time the paired devices are disconnected,in accordance with embodiments of the present invention. FIG. 5B beginsunder the assumption that fingerprint enhanced authentication was usedto securely pair an infusion pump and controller. Operation 520 has theinfusion pump in a normal operating state that flows to operation 522where the distance between the controller and infusion pump isperiodically monitored. In one embodiment the relative signal strengthbetween the controller and infusion pump can be used to estimate adistance between the infusion pump and the controller. Operation 524queries whether the distance between the devices is beyond or within thethreshold distance. If the distance between the two devices is withinthe threshold, the procedure returns to operation 520. If the distancebetween the two devices exceeds the threshold, operation 526 sets atimeout.

Operation 528 queries whether the timeout has expired before thecontroller is determined to be back within the threshold range. If thecontroller is back in range before the timeout the procedure returns tooperation 520. If the timeout expires without the controller coming backinto the threshold range operation 530 sets controller lock in theinfusion pump. Following operation 530, operation 532 continues toperiodically monitor the distance to the controller. Operation 534queries whether the distance between the controller and the infusionpump is back within the specified threshold distance. If the distance tothe controller is beyond the threshold, operation 530 is executed. Ifthe distance between the controller and the infusion pump is back in thespecified threshold range operation 536 results in the infusion devicerequesting the user to provide a fingerprint on the controller.Operation 538 follows which has the controller send the fingerprint datato the infusion device. In one embodiment this means sending the tokengenerated from the fingerprint scan to the infusion pump. Operation 540queries whether the fingerprint sent to the infusion device matches. Insome embodiments, this means comparing the received token to the tokenor tokens received while the devices were initially paired. If thefingerprints match the procedure returns to operation 520. If thefingerprints do not match, operation 542 is executed where a securitycondition in invoked. In one embodiment the security condition has theinfusion device request new user pairing and generates an alarm. Inanother embodiment, the security condition automatically ceasescommunication with the controller and generates an alarm to notify theuser that the controller has become unpaired. In still anotherembodiment the security condition may generate an alarm/alert for theuser while locking out predetermined command from the controller. In oneembodiment the predetermined commands include any command that alters ormodifies insulin delivery. Furthermore, in still additional embodimentsa preset number of attempts to enter an acceptable fingerprint or tokenis allowed before the security condition invoked. The various securitycondition embodiments discussed above are exemplary and should not beconsidered restrictive or comprehensive. Notification of the user and/orchanges to the programming infusion pump in response to a failure tomatch fingerprints should be considered analogous or within the scope ofthis disclosure. While FIGS. 5A and 5B illustrates secure pairing withfingerprints, other embodiments can utilize other methods of out-of-bandsecure pairing. For additional embodiments see U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 14/107,872, filed on Dec. 16, 2013, Attorney Docket no.C00005851.USU1 titled SECURE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ELEMENTS IN AWIRELESS NETWORK, by Kris Holtzclaw which is herein incorporated byreference in its entirety.

FIG. 6 is an exemplary flowchart illustrating operations to utilize userconfigurable security modes for securely paired infusion pump andcontroller, in accordance with embodiments of the present invention. Theflowchart begins with START operation 600 and operation 602 results inhigh-level security mode or condition being the default security modebetween the infusion pump and the controllers. Operation 604 begins thepairing process between the controller and infusion pump (for additionalinformation see FIG. 5). After successfully pairing the infusion pumpand controller operation 606 allows the user to select a security modeafter which normal communications are established in operation 608. Fromnormal communication 608 the three different options can be undertakenand they include operation 608 a where the devices become unpaired,operation 608 b where a suspect signal is detected or operation 608 cwhere the system shuts down and the flow chart terminates with ENDoperation 622.

Operation 608 a, the devices becoming unpaired, results in returning tooperation 602 where the security mode is set to a high-level. There aremany potential causes that may lead to the devices becoming unpaired.For example, there may be radio interference with other devices,environmental factors, lower power, software glitches and the like.Regardless of the cause, in embodiment shown in FIG. 6 if the devicesbecome unpaired after having established normal communication 608, thesystem defaults to a high-level security mode. The specific embodimentshown in FIG. 6 should not be construed as limiting nor as the onlyoption. Various other embodiments can results in different operationsbeing executed while still falling within the scope of this disclosure.

Operation 608 b, the detection of a suspect signal, results in executionof operation 610, a security check. A suspect signal is a signaldetected by the system that appears to match some characteristics of anexpected signal, but may be coming in at a signal strength that is toohigh or too low for the set security mode. When the controller and pumpare paired and the user selects a security mode both the pump andcontroller transmit and expect to receive signals having signal strengthwithin a specified range for the desired security mode. For example, ina high security mode the digital attenuator will provide highattenuation so any signal transmitted will be intentionally weak, so asto minimize the area in which the signal can be detected. Similarly, thepaired device will anticipate receiving a weak signal because the highsecurity mode is selected. In another example, if a low security more ischosen the digital attenuator will provide minimal signal attenuationthereby allowing the device to transmit to a larger area. Accordingly,the paired device will anticipate receiving a higher strength signalthan if the security mode was set to medium or high.

Operation 612 suspends or pauses data transfer between the infusion pumpand controller after initiation of the security check 610. Execution ofoperation 614 results in a debounce procedure being performed on thesuspect signal such that a single reading of a suspect signal does notforever eliminate communication with a particular device. From operation614, option 614 a results if the debounce procedure is resolved whereinnormal communication 608 is resumed. Option 614 b results if thedebounce procedure results in a persistent suspect signal resulting inoperation 616 where special commands are sent to verify authenticity ofthe suspect signal. Option 616 b results if the suspect signal is deemedauthentic resulting in return to operation 608, normal communications.Option 616 a results if the suspect signal fails to be verified asauthentic leading to operation 618 where communication with the suspectsignal is terminated. After operation 618, operation 620 notifies theuser of the presence of a suspect signal. From operation 620 operation602 is executed where the default security mode is set to high-level.

FIG. 7 is an exemplary flow chart illustrating specific operationswithin operation 616 of FIG. 6, in accordance with embodiments of thepresent invention. Operations 700-710 are executed within operation 616and operation 700 has the pump requesting a pairing token from thecontroller. Operation 702 results in the controller notifying the userof the suspect signal and requests confirmation of secure communicationwith the pump. In order to verify secure communication the controllerrequests the user to scan their fingerprint(s) in operation 704.Operation 706 has the controller recalculate the token from the scannedfingerprints(s) while operation 708 has the controller transmit thetokens to the pump. Operation 710 has the pump compare the tokenreceived from the controller to the token from the pairing phase anddecision 712 determines if the tokens match. If the tokens matchoperation 616 b is executed while operation 616 a is executed if thetokens do not match.

While the description above refers to particular embodiments of thepresent invention, it will be understood that many modifications may bemade without departing from the spirit thereof. The accompanying claimsare intended to cover such modifications as would fall within the truescope and spirit of the present invention. The presently disclosedembodiments are therefore to be considered in all respects asillustrative and not restrictive, the scope of the invention beingindicated by the appended claims, rather than the foregoing description,and all changes which come within the meaning and range of equivalencyof the claims are therefore intended to be embraced therein.

What is claimed is:
 1. An infusion system to administer fluid, theinfusion system comprising: an infusion pump having a pump processor, apump memory and a pump radio to enable bi-directional communication, thepump radio further including an attenuator being configurable and thepump memory storing a plurality of security modes, each of the pluralityof security modes configuring the attenuator to receive signals of apredetermined strength, and a controller having a controller processor,a controller memory, a controller radio to transmit and receivecommunication from the pump radio, the controller further having agraphical user interface shown on a display, and controls to manipulatethe graphical user interface, the controller being paired with theinfusion pump based on pairing data, wherein a security check isperformed when the infusion pump receives a suspect signal, the suspectsignal not matching the predetermined strength associated with aselected security mode.
 2. An infusion system as described in claim 1,wherein initiation of the security check pauses data transfer betweenthe infusion pump and a device transmitting the suspect signal.
 3. Aninfusion system as described in claim 2, wherein the security checkincludes a debounce procedure.
 4. An infusion system as described inclaim 3, wherein authenticity of a device sending the suspect signal isdetermined by the infusion pump sending a special series of commands. 5.An infusion system as described in claim 4, wherein the special seriesof commands includes a request for the pairing data.
 6. An infusionsystem as described in claim 5, wherein failure to receive the pairingdata terminates communication between the infusion pump and the devicetransmitting the suspect signal.
 7. An infusion system as described inclaim 5, wherein upon passing the security check communications betweenthe infusion pump and the suspect signal is resumed.
 8. An infusionsystem as described in claim 1, wherein prior to pairing the infusionpump and the controller the default security mode for the security pumpis high.
 9. An infusion system as described in claim 1, wherein afterpairing the infusion pump and the controller the security mode for theinfusion pump is selected by a user.
 10. An infusion system as describedin claim 9, wherein the security mode includes settings that arecustomizable by the user.
 11. A method to secure wireless transmissionsbetween an infusion device and a controller, the method comprising:pairing the infusion device and the controller with a default securitysetting; prompting the setting of a security mode for on-goingcommunication between the infusion device and the controller; initiatingnormal communication between the infusion device and the controller, andinitiating a security check if a suspect signal is detected, a suspectsignal being a signal that does not match signal strength anticipated bythe security mode.
 12. A method to secure wireless transmissions betweenan infusion device and a controller as described in claim 11, whereinthe setting of the security mode automatically adjusts a digitalattenuator defined to attenuate signals transmitted and received by theinfusion device.
 13. A method to secure wireless transmissions betweenan infusion device and a controller as described in claim 12, whereinthe default security setting is for high security.
 14. A method tosecure wireless transmissions between an infusion device and acontroller as described in claim 13, wherein the high security settingattenuates reception and transmission of signals from the infusiondevice to less than six feet.
 15. A method to secure wirelesstransmissions between an infusion device and a controller as describedin claim 11, further comprising: pausing normal communication betweenthe infusion device and the controller, and initiating a debounceprocedure to determine if the mismatch is persistent.
 16. A method tosecure wireless transmissions between an infusion device and acontroller as described in claim 15, further comprising: determining theauthenticity of the suspect signal by sending a series of commands;receiving verification of authenticity of the suspect signal andresuming normal communication or determining the suspect signal is froman untrusted source, terminating further communication, and alerting theuser that secure communication between the infusion device andcontroller has been compromised.
 17. A method to secure wirelesstransmissions between an infusion device and a controller as describedin claim 16, wherein determining authenticity of the suspect signal usesverification of previously exchanged out of band pairing information.18. A method to secure wireless transmissions between an infusion deviceand a controller as described in claim 11 wherein the security mode isuser customized.
 19. A method to secure wireless transmissions betweenan infusion device and a controller as described in claim 18 whereincustomization of the security mode modifies attenuation levels.
 20. Amethod to secure wireless transmissions between an infusion device and acontroller as described in claim 15 where the debounce procedure changesdepending on the security mode.